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INTRODUCTION
This is an Article about a pair of metaphors and the light that
metaphors can shed on the process of judging in constitutional cases and
the nature of constitutional change. The more familiar of these metaphors
suggests that judges, including those in constitutional cases, act
analogously to umpires.1 I have suggested in prior work that this is
misguided and that a second metaphor is more apt. Judging in the
American legal system often requires judges to engage in a mode of
reasoning akin to that of their counterparts in “aesthetic” sports such as
figure skating and gymnastics.2 The process involves not merely the
simple application of rules (as the judge-as-umpire metaphor suggests),
but rather often entails adherence to norms and the application of
standards and principles that are often beyond the capacity of language to
fully capture. Sometimes these norms, standards, and principles help the
judge decide which of a host of applicable legal reasons to privilege.

* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Thanks to participants at
“Amending America’s Unwritten Constitution,” sponsored by the Boston College Institute for
Liberal Arts and the University of Texas School of Law, to participants in a faculty workshop at
Marquette University Law School, and to Bruce Boyden, Emily Cauble, Atiba Ellis, Alex
Lemann, Kali Murray, Ryan Scoville, and Mark Sides for their helpful feedback.
1. The most famous of these invocations was by Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation
hearing. See Transcript: Day One of the Roberts Hearings, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2005, 12:00
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.
html [https://perma.cc/C8YC-VU2T].
2. See Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 981 (2018).
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Other times they serve to provide more particularized content to those
reasons.
The notion of such intangible knowledge is not new, nor is the idea
that judges must sometimes draw on it. The underlying concept has been
reflected in philosopher Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory,3 scientist and
philosopher Michael Polanyi’s “tacit knowledge,”4 United States
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s declaration that
“[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases,”5 and scholar Karl
Llewellyn’s “situation sense”—the latter characterizing it as a
combination of “ways and attitudes which are much more and better felt
and done than they are said.”6 Just as figure-skating judges must apply
indeterminate criteria such as “flow and effortless glide,”7 and must
otherwise judge in a context in which the written rules of the sport do not
(because they cannot) fully specify what judges are to privilege and how
they are to go about assessing it, so must legal judges apply
underspecified concepts such as “due process” and “equal protection”
and unspecified concepts such as “separation of powers” and
“federalism” while making choices about the applicability and weight of
various interpretive modalities. This is not to suggest a pervasive lack of
readily applicable criteria. There are easy questions in both contexts. But
both types of judges also routinely draw on internalized senses of what
sorts of criteria are appropriate to a situation and use those criteria to
assess the relative appropriateness and strength of the various arguments
and potential conclusions available.8 Justice Stewart’s (in)famous “I
3. See DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING: SUBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND THE
MAKING OF LAW 52–54 (2016).
4. The core idea in the concept of tacit knowledge is “we . . . know more than we can tell.”
MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (1966) [hereinafter POLANYI, TACIT DIMENSION]
(emphasis omitted). Polanyi contends “that strictly speaking nothing that we know can be said
precisely,” and that some types of knowledge are so thoroughly beyond our capacity to describe
that they may properly be labeled “ineffable.” MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE:
TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 87–88 (1962) [hereinafter POLANYI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE]. “[T]o the extent to which our intelligence falls short of the ideal of precise
formulation, we act and see by the light of unspecifiable knowledge,” which sometimes, including
in the case of the common law, can be embodied in tradition, in recognition of the principle “that
practical wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed in rules of action.” Id. at 53–
54.
5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960).
7. U.S. FIGURE SKATING JUDGES EDUC. & TRAINING SUBCOMM., U.S. FIGURE SKATING
SINGLE/PAIRS JUDGING MANUAL FOR TEST JUDGES’ TRANINING 25 (1979), https://www.usfsa.org/
content/00S-PSchool%20Manual2-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B9W-5HX3].
8. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (“Judges and lawyers subscribe to an elaborate
network of craft norms. Acquired through professional training and experience, these norms
generate a high degree of convergence . . . on what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”).
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know it when I see it”9 formulation may be unfashionable, and indeed it
may not satisfy all the norms associated with the judicial role, but it
captures a core truth about judging.
This Article extends the project of exploring the metaphor to the
specific context of constitutional adjudication and change. It works from
the understanding that both sports and constitutional law can be
understood as “practices” in the philosophical sense, as “activities that
are constituted by the convergent or overlapping understandings,
expectations, and intentions of multiple participants.”10 The analysis is
thus fundamentally comparative in nature. Conceiving of the operation
of constitutional law in these terms, like any comparative analysis, helps
to uncover and highlight certain of its features, including the ways in
which its content is susceptible to change, only some of which occur in
the formalistic ways easily accounted for by the umpire model. The
approach is useful not only in providing a counter to the notion of the
judge-as-umpire, but also in that it helps flesh out, supplement, and make
more concrete a model of constitutional law that includes judicially
implemented change.
The metaphor also operates as a caution. Figure-skating judges, after
all, do not enjoy a sterling reputation for impartiality or incorruptibility.11
Recognition that judges in the legal system perform an analogous role—
and one that is likewise heavily dependent on the good-faith application
of an internalized cluster of norms and values—thus serves to highlight
the need for attention to institutional legitimacy and invites consideration
of ways in which that legitimacy might be preserved (or eroded). If the
9. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
10. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 88 (2018).
Fallon elaborates as follows:
American constitutional law is a practice in this sense, constituted by the
shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the
constitutional order and participate in constitutional argument and adjudicative
practices. It is crucial to recognize, moreover, that the relevant understandings
and expectations go far beyond knowledge of the linguistic meanings of the
Constitution’s words and the history of its drafting and ratification.
Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1957 (2008)
(“[T]he recognition and non-recognition of law and legal sources is better understood as a practice
in the Wittgensteinian sense: a practice in which lawyers, judges, commentators, and other legal
actors gradually and in diffuse fashion determine what will count as a legitimate source—and thus
what will count as law.”).
11. The highest profile scandal took place at the 2002 Winter Olympics and resulted in a
substantial reworking of the judging system, which has continued to undergo adjustments in the
wake of subsequent controversies. Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, Despite Reforms, Figure Skating
Battles Scoring Flaws, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2018, 8:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usolympics-2018-figs-scoring/despite-reforms-figure-skating-battles-scoring-flaws-idUSKBN1F1
1L2 [https://perma.cc/298H-MJGP].
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comparison reveals that some of the two worlds’ shared features play a
significant part in the story of why figure-skating judging is regarded with
suspicion, then we ought to carefully examine those features’ role in the
legal system as well. This lesson is especially pertinent in the current
environment of deep partisan division.
I. AESTHETIC JUDGING IN SPORT AND LAW
A. A Brief Overview of Judging in Aesthetic Sports
Philosophers of sport have distinguished between sports in which the
role of officials is primarily to ensure compliance with the rules, with
scoring determined in a manner that is otherwise independent of the
officials’ judgment, and those in which a primary responsibility of the
officials is to assess the competitors’ performances and thereby to serve
as the source of the scores based on which winners and losers are
determined.12 The former, known under one formulation as “purposive”
sports,13 includes football, basketball, hockey, and baseball. In such
sports scoring depends on the achievement of specified goals—getting
the ball across the goal line or through the hoop, for example—with no
consideration for how the goal is achieved so long as it is not done in a
prohibited manner.14 The latter, sometimes called “aesthetic” sports,15
most prominently includes figure skating and gymnastics, but also
includes some equestrian sports as well as more recent additions to the
sports landscape such as snowboarding. These sports place considerably
less emphasis on the achievement of a specified goal and more on the
manner in which the goal is achieved.16 It is impossible to “win ugly” in
an aesthetic sport, for the simple reason that skilled, and often beautiful,
performance is the central criterion in determining who wins. And while
teams and athletes in purposive sports routinely overcome officials’
blown calls, the nature of aesthetic sports and the role of judges within
them make it nearly impossible to win in the face of error by an official
for the simple reason that it is, fundamentally, the officials who determine
who wins and who loses.
These differences have implications for the nature of officials’ roles.
An official in a purposive sport determines whether some antecedent state
of affairs complied with what is often (though not always17) a bright-line
12. See, e.g., DAVID BEST, PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN MOVEMENT 103–05 (1978).
13. Id. at 103–04.
14. Id. at 104.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. As Mark Graber has pointed out, the role of an official in such sports often involves
considerably less mechanistic application of rules than meets the eye and considerably more
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rule, sometimes literally, in the sense that the job often entails assessing
where a ball or a player was relative to some painted line. These sorts of
assessments can be, and increasingly are, reviewed for correctness by
instant replay. In contrast, the judge assessing a performance in an
aesthetic sport draws upon his or her expertise to give significance to an
antecedent state of affairs in a much more holistic sense. Such
assessments involve the balancing of sometimes incommensurable
considerations and are too observer-dependent for replay review to serve
as anything more than a replacement for, rather than correction of, the
initial determinations. As author Nicholas Dixon puts it, “Even if we can
agree on common criteria for aesthetic judgments, two different works of
art— or athletic performances—can qualify as aesthetically pleasing by
virtue of different subsets of these criteria, making it difficult to make
comparative judgments.”18
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rules in aesthetic sports typically provide
little in the way of specific criteria for judges to draw upon in assessing
performances.19 The factors that make up excellence in a given sport are
too diverse and too disjunctive—and the balancing and weighing of them
too complex—to be reduced to a formula.20 Put differently, any attempt
to articulate criteria would be incomplete, and a formula would
necessarily leave some components of excellence excluded or
undervalued—and others elevated—with inevitable and potentially
undesirable consequences for the nature of the sport itself. Judges possess
what Polanyi terms “subsidiary knowledge”; they “can indicate their
clues and formulate their maxims, they know many more things than they
can tell, knowing them only in practice, as instrumental particulars, and
not explicitly, as objects.”21 These sports thus rely on judges’
internalization of what constitutes excellence within the sport. The judge
has in mind an ideal performance, or a set of ideals corresponding to each
component of a performance, and she scores each actual performance
based on her assessment of where it stands in relation to the ideal.22 One
acting in ways that require drawing on an understanding of the context in which a decision takes
place. Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected
Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293, 302 (1999). “Most games, from little league baseball to
professional basketball, would neither be as fun nor as recreational if sports officials understood
their responsibilities as enforcing rules rather than as preventing teams from gaining unfair
advantages in ways not intended by the laws of the game.” Id.
18. Nicholas Dixon, Canadian Figure Skaters, French Judges, and Realism in Sport, 30 J.
PHIL. SPORT 103, 104–05 (2003).
19. See Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1024–25.
20. See id. at 1025–26.
21. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 88.
22. See Bernard Suits, Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport, 15 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 6 (1988)
(“In performances, ideals are the crux of the matter. Just these ideals generate just these skills.
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of the criteria in figure skating, for example, is “[f]low and effortless
glide,”23 which is not a self-executing rule in the sense that someone not
familiar with figure skating would be able to apply it in the appropriate
way, but rather a standard that can be understood and applied only by
someone who has internalized the norms of the sport.
The inherent imprecision of this structure means that no judge will
judge in precisely the same way as any other. Each will have traveled a
unique path of acculturation into the sport, and each will have developed
a perspective shaped by that acculturation and its interaction with her
unique personality. Judges will thus vary in terms of how they go about
the process of observing competitors, what they look for, and how they
prioritize what they see.24 The result is that each judge will, to some
greater or lesser degree, vary from the next in terms of her conception of
ideas like “flow and effortless glide,” of the nature of the ideal
performance more generally, and of how well any given competitor
measures up to them.
Significantly, none of this is to suggest that all bets are off and that
judging in aesthetic sports is of the unmoored, “subjective” nature by
which it is often characterized. The knowledge or sense upon which a
judge draws did not spontaneously generate, but rather accreted over a
long process of acculturation in the sport as the judge internalized the
often unspoken understandings of how the sport is best undertaken. And
the selection procedures for becoming a judge in aesthetic sports, which
typically require prospective judges to undertake a process of apprentice
judging in which they demonstrate that their assessments are sufficiently
similar to those of established judges, provide a mechanism for ensuring
That is why it is possible to speak of a perfect performance, at least in principle, without fear of
contradiction . . . .”).
23. The concept is further explained as follows: “Rhythm, strength, clean strokes, and an
efficient use of lean create a steady run to the blade and an ease of transfer of weight resulting in
seemingly effortless power and acceleration.” U.S. Figure Skating Ass’n, Components with
Explanations, https://www.usfigureskating.org/content/JS08A-Programcompexplan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DR34-2JL9] (stating the various factors in figure-skating judging).
24. See, e.g., Clare MacMahon & Bill Mildenhall, A Practical Perspective on Decision
Making Influences in Sports Officiating, 7 INT’L J. SPORTS SCI. & COACHING 153, 160 (2012)
(discussing officials’ use of heuristics).
Ideally, all stimuli that are relevant for judging a performance are processed.
However, because the human capacity to process information is limited, a judge
needs to select which stimuli should undergo further processing. At best, judges
know how to allocate their attention. For instance, expert judges in gymnastics
have been shown to differ from novices in their visual search strategies. By and
large, this research shows that expert judges in sports develop effective
anticipatory strategies that help to improve their decision making.
Henning Plessner & Thomas Haar, Sports Performance Judgments from a Social Cognitive
Perspective, 7 PSYCHOL. SPORT & EXERCISE 555, 560 (2006) (citations omitted).
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broad consistency in the standards that are applied.25 In other words, a
prospective judge must demonstrate that she has sufficiently internalized
the understandings and expectations of the sport and its participants.
Of course, this lack of specificity and of an ability to resort to some
external touchstone for purposes of detecting and correcting errors opens
judging in aesthetic sports to charges that decisions are the product of
improper criteria. The very nature of the system is such that judges cannot
point to some external measuring stick by which observers can verify that
their decisions were the “correct” ones.26 The effect is exacerbated by the
seeming inconsistencies resulting from the fact that each judge will hold
a conception of the ideal that differs in some respects from that of her
colleagues.27 To a considerable degree, these sports ask participants and
observers to take the legitimacy of judges’ scoring on faith while at the
same time making it easy to question that faith.
Let us take a step back to view the process from a slightly different
angle. We can regard judges’ decisions as being based in three broad
categories of factors. The first category of factors (category-one factors)
is a set of universally, or near-universally, accepted ideas about what
constitutes excellence in the sport. Many of these are so basic as to be
assumed obvious, such as the notion that, all else being equal, a figureskating routine performed without a fall will be superior to one with a
fall, or a jump with four rotations is superior to one with three. But
certainly there are other areas of broad agreement concerning lessspecifiable but nonetheless real aspects of posture or form as well as
things we might regard as core components of the etiquette of the sport—
certain things that one simply does or does not do and as to which
transgressions are generally understood to be nonmeritorious behavior.28
The second category (category-two factors) consists of factors arising
out of differing “schools of thought” regarding the nature of an ideal
performance.29 Differences of taste, as I have suggested above, are
unavoidable. All the factors that combine to give us each personalities
that are unique, but which nonetheless bear categorizable similarities to
others, likewise do their work in this more limited space.30 It should come
as no surprise, for example, that a sport community in one country will
have somewhat different visions of what constitutes the ideal than in
25. Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1035–36.
26. Id. at 1059.
27. See id. at 1028–29.
28. See id. at 1026.
29. See id. at 1029.
30. “Some judges like a particular style of music or skating over another. Cultural
differences often come into play. Eastern European judges often prefer classical
performances . . . . Western judges tend to be more receptive to rock or movie music . . . . ” Jere
Longman, Olympics: The Scorekeepers; Scrutiny Has Judges Feeling Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2002, at D1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5

398

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

another.31 Nor should it come as a surprise that judges might exhibit what
looks like “nationalistic bias”—that is, that judges conditioned to
recognize and reward the particular version of excellences valued in their
country will replicate that at the international level (and that their scores
will therefore appear to favor their own competitors).32 These sorts of
differences will also manifest themselves on a smaller scale, both in terms
of variances in regional preferences as well as differing sets of
preferences or “schools of thought” that emerge around preferences for
particular positions or ways of moving.33 They might reflect intractable
differences of emphasis that will never resolve into consensus, or they
might be manifestations of an evolution or unsettling of some component
of the performative ideal that will eventually resolve into a broadly shared
understanding. Either way, their existence is inevitable and largely
untroubling.
Notably, judges drawing on criteria from either of these categories
will not be acting subjectively in any strong sense of the word. That is,
they will not be basing their decisions on unconstrained personal
preference. They will instead be channeling a shared vision of excellence
that they have internalized, and as a result, be applying a standard that is,
in an important sense, external to them. So long as they apply this vision
consistently and act in good faith to apply the performative ideal as they
understand it, they are acting in accordance with their role.
It is the third category (category-three factors) that provides the
greatest cause for concern. Broadly speaking, it includes any reason for a
judge’s decision that does not fall within the first two categories. More
narrowly, we can identify certain sorts of factors that might influence a
judge’s decisions but that are by all accounts improper. Thoroughly
subjective judging, in the sense that it is intentionally based on some
preference not among those viewed among the sports community as a
legitimate component of the performative ideal, would certainly fall into
this category. A judge who favored a competitor because of a relationship
with that competitor, or because she was bribed, or because she happened

31. One of the theories for the relative decline in the success of American figure skaters in
international competition is that the American system was not sufficiently quick to react to
changes in the international scoring system, such that American skaters rising through the ranks
were rewarded for excellences that are not well-aligned with those valued at the international
level. See Tara Lipinski, Opinion, It’s Time to Take Risks in the Rink Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2018, at A19.
32. See, e.g., Cheryl Litman & Thomas Stratmann, Judging on Thin Ice: The Effects of
Group Membership on Evaluation, 70 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 763, 774 (2018); Eric Zitzewitz,
Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making, 15 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 67, 68–69 (2006).
33. Zitzewitz, supra note 32, at 68–69.
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to find something about the competitor’s appearance particularly
appealing, would be acting within this prohibited realm.
There are also less pernicious ways in which a judge might be
influenced by improper factors, and these, too, provide cause for concern.
Research has revealed that a variety of factors can influence judges’
scoring, including a competitor’s reputation34 or team affiliation;35
whether a given competitor appeared earlier or later within a sequence;36
and whether the judge has access to the scores of other judges. 37 These
effects need not be, and likely are often not, intentional or even conscious
influences. They nonetheless represent a skewing of scoring away from
what a pure, good-faith application of the performative ideal calls for.
Aesthetic sports use a variety of mechanisms that can be viewed as
attempts to either encourage greater reliance on category-one factors or
to decrease reliance on category-three factors. One approach is to change
the rules of the sport to more precisely specify the criteria that judges
must use, including by placing greater emphasis on those that are
objectively verifiable—in effect, to make the practice of judging
relatively more quantitative and less qualitative in nature. 38 As an
example, figure skating’s International Judging System (IJS), put in place
following a judging scandal in the 2002 Winter Olympics, places greater
weight on verifiable, technical elements of skating relative to its
predecessor, which has in turn changed the nature of the skating that is
rewarded under that system.39
Other mechanisms exert a less direct influence. As noted already, the
most basic of these is built into the processes by which one becomes a
judge. Aesthetic sports almost universally require prospective judges to
spend time in an apprenticeship of sorts, shadowing and scoring
alongside accredited judges.40 Becoming a judge in the first instance
requires that the candidate establish that her scores are sufficiently similar
to those of accredited judges, thereby supporting the conclusion that she
34. Leanne C. Findlay & Diane M. Ste-Marie, A Reputation Bias in Figure Skating Judging,
26 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 154, 161 (2004).
35. See id. at 164.
36. Iain Greenlees et al., Order Effects in Sport: Examining the Impact of Order of
Information Presentation on Attributions of Ability, 8 PSYCHOL. SPORT & EXPERTISE 477, 485
(2007).
37. See, e.g., Filip Boen et al., Open Feedback in Gymnastic Judging Causes Conformity
Bias Based on Informational Influencing, 26 J. SPORTS SCI. 621, 626 (2008); Filip Boen et al., The
Impact of Open Feedback on Conformity Among Judges in Rope Skipping, 7 PSYCHOL. SPORT &
EXERCISE 577, 578 (2006) (describing research supporting the existence of six distinct biases,
including a “conformity effect”).
38. See Graham McFee, Officiating in Aesthetic Sports, 40 J. PHIL. SPORT 1, 6–7 (2013).
39. Id. at 8–9, 11–12.
40. See, e.g., School of Judging, USA GYMNASTICS, https://usagym.org/pages/education/
pages/judging/ [https://perma.cc/HJ3C-BFXV]; So You Want to Be a Figure Skating Judge?, U.S.
FIGURE SKATING, http://usfigureskating.org/story?id=89433 [https://perma.cc/U25C-6SK8].
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has internalized the norms of the sport to an adequate degree. 41 Moving
up through the ranks of judges involves replicating this basic process at
each succeeding level.42 All of this, of course, is necessarily preceded by
a period in which the prospective judge must internalize the norms of the
sport and thereby formulate a concept of an ideal performance that is
sufficiently like that of the existing set of judges.43
Sports use other mechanisms, as well, to attempt to channel judges’
behavior in appropriate directions. To various degrees and in various
combinations, aesthetic sports prescribe the locations from which judges
view competitors,44 the extent to which communication is allowed
between judges scoring the same event and between judges and
competitors,45 and whether and to what extent judges provide an
explanation of their scoring.46 Sports also routinely police for conflicts of
interest, either by prohibiting judges from concurrently serving as
coaches for any competitors in any context or by putting in place more
limited restrictions aimed to prevent judges from scoring competitors
with whom they have recently had a coaching or other relationship, and
by otherwise attempting to minimize conflicts of interest that might be
perceived as influencing judges’ behavior.47 At least in some instances,
such as the Olympics, widespread attention and media interest provide a
further source of discipline.48
Of course, even taken as a whole these processes combine to provide
only partial constraint. The combination of substantially ineffable and
therefore indeterminate standards, together with reliance on mechanisms
that only indirectly and imprecisely channel judges’ behavior, results in
a world in which it is unrealistic to expect complete correspondence
between existing judges or between existing and prospective judges. This
leaves judging open to the critiques alluded to above. But there is another
consequence, which is to allow for shifts in the content of the
performative ideal. To the extent that incoming judges hold conceptions
of the ideal that differ in consistent ways from the views of existing
judges, the content of the ideal will shift with the changing pool of judges.
The change will necessarily be gradual and will be inherently resistant to
dramatic shifts of the sort that would have been necessary, for example,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1035–36.
See id. at 1036.
See So You Want to Be a Figure Skating Judge?, supra note 40.
Oldfather, supra note 2, at 1062–64.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1057–58.
Id. at 1054–55.
Litman & Stratmann, supra note 32, at 766.
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to accommodate a skater such as Surya Bonaly.49 And at least in its
particulars, that evolution might be regarded as good or bad from a
normative perspective. Its existence, however, seems inevitable, and in a
general sense necessary for the continued legitimacy of the process for
the simple reason that the continued viability of the sport requires
participants to buy into the idea that judges’ decisions reflect the
conceptions of excellence held generally in the sport.
B. Aesthetic Judging as a Metaphor for Judging in Law
All of this, or so it seems, looks quite similar to the situation
confronted by judges in the legal system, especially in constitutional
cases. To be sure, a considerable portion of judges’ work is governed by
concepts that are articulable and that have indeed been articulated in rules
that provide a clear resolution to a case or some of the issues presented
within a case.50 This is true even in the Supreme Court, in which a
substantial portion of decisions are unanimous.51 In this respect the
operation of the legal system resembles a purposive sport, and the
familiar judge-as-umpire metaphor is, at the very least, not inapt.
But the easy cases do not represent the portion of the judiciary’s work
that provokes concern. As one moves from clear text to ambiguity, or
from a situation clearly governed by past decisions to cases of first
impression, or from situations where all available authority appears to
support one result to those in which the authorities conflict, judges must
draw upon a widening array of methodological tools.52 Considerations
such as “fit” take on an increasingly large role, and a conclusion that one
approach or another better “fits” a given situation is often simply the
assertion that, for reasons that are beyond the capacity of the judge to
fully articulate, that approach best comports with her intuitive sense of
49. See Tik Root, Twenty Years Later, Figure Skating’s Most Famous Back Flip Remains
Amazing (and Illegal), WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/sports/wp/2018/02/22/twenty-years-later-figure-skatings-most-famous-backflip-remainsamazing-and-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/8J3U-JRK6].
50. There seems to be general agreement on the proposition that most cases are easy, though
estimates vary as to the precise proportion. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the
New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251,
286–87 (1997).
51. Since the 1940s, the Court has consistently decided roughly forty percent of its cases
unanimously. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 249 tbl.3-1 (6th ed. 2015).
52. It would be more accurate to say that here is where they consciously draw upon such
tools, as contrasted with the easier cases, in which the same forces are at work but are less likely
to be consciously deployed. See Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (1984)
(“[R]ules, in law or anywhere else, do not stand in an independent relationship to a field of action
on which they can simply be imposed; rather, rules have a circular or mutually interdependent
relationship to the field of action in that they make sense only in reference to the very regularities
they are thought to bring about.”).
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the significant features of a situation and how the law applies to them.
Karl Llewellyn’s notion of “situation sense,” first invoked above, is the
most prominent articulation of this idea in the legal world. This
knowledge, too, is the product of immersion in the craft of law, of having
refined one’s sense of pattern recognition and thus internalized a sense
of, if not the appropriate resolution to any given situation, at least the
appropriate sorts of considerations to be taken into account in resolving
it.53 The net result bears a strong resemblance to the situation in aesthetic
sports. There exists, as an analogue to the performative ideal, a
conception of law that represents the distillation of all pertinent legal
concepts bearing on the situation before the judge.54 It, too, is diffuse and
often indeterminate. It is not the “brooding omnipresence” that Justice
Holmes derided,55 but rather “the felt reconciliation of concrete
instances” that he praised as necessary to give content to a general
principle.56
Of course, no real judge has access to this ideal conception of law, and
individual judges vary in their ability and inclination to approximate it,
as well as in their views of how the ideal ought to be conceived. Here,
too, one can imagine the judge’s thought processes being influenced by
three categories of factors, which are analogous to those identified above
for judges in aesthetic sports. The first category includes generally
accepted ideas about what counts as appropriate legal authority and how

53. Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense?” An Experimental Investigation
of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 356, 360–62 (2016);
see also Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011)
(“Judges and lawyers subscribe to an elaborate network of craft norms. Acquired through
professional training and experience, these norms generate a high degree of convergence among
judges and lawyers on what counts as appropriate decisionmaking.”).
54. In the constitutional context, I take my suggestion to be at least broadly consistent with
Mitchell Berman’s concept of “principled positivism.” See Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled
Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325, 1331 (2018). Berman summarizes the idea as follows:
Constitutional rules are determined by the interactions of our constitutional
principles. In turn, constitutional principles are grounded in social and
psychological facts—facts about what persons who make up the legal
community say and do and believe. Principles exist in virtue of being “taken up”
in certain ways by certain people. I will call this view “principled positivism”:
legal rules are constituted by the interaction of legal principles, and legal
principles are grounded in social facts that make up a complex social practice.
Id.

55. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, in SPEECHES 28, 35 (1913).
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judges are to use that authority in their reasoning process.57 It is generally
understood that statutory and constitutional text matter and should play a
prominent role in analysis to the extent they are sufficiently determinate
to do so.58 Past case law likewise provides a point of departure for
reasoning in any current case. There are more diffuse ideas in this
category as well, such as that the doing of law entails reasoning forward
from premises rather than backward from conclusions, that “[r]easoned
elaboration” is a hallmark of legal reasoning, and a host of other ideas
associated with rule-of-law values, all of which typically remain in the
shadows, unstated but understood.59 This first category likely includes a
broad swath of matters as to which there is greater reflective equilibrium
than meets the eye. Our natural tendency to focus on difficult cases, both
in law school and legal scholarship, may lead to a discounting of the
degree of constraint provided by category-one factors.60
The second category of considerations, involving different “schools
of thought,” is large and the familiar topic of debate. Judges might
generally agree that the text of a statute or constitution provides the
beginning point of analysis, but there are differing views as to whether it
should provide the end point as well, what it might mean for it to provide
the end point, and how to make sense of the words that comprise a text.61
57. As Fish points out, it is tempting to overlook the fact that these factors, too, are rooted
in shared assumptions and understandings:
There is a temptation . . . to assume that . . . cases of perfect agreement are
normative and that interpretation and its troubles enter in only in special
circumstances. But agreement is not a function of particularly clear and
perspicuous rules; it is a function of the fact that interpretive assumptions and
procedures are so widely shared in a community that the rule appears to all in the
same (interpreted) shape.
Fish, supra note 52, at 1327.
58. Notably, this represents the sort of fluidity among the categories identified below. Many
commentators regard the primacy of text as something that has moved into this first category only
over the past thirty or forty years, and many further regard this as largely attributable to the efforts
of Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1296
(1990) (“Before Justice Scalia’s appointment . . . the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation
could be described as eclectic, devoid of any unifying theory.”).
59. Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 73 NEV. L.J. 515, 547 (2016); see
Adam Rigoni, Common-Law Judicial Reasoning and Analogy, 20 LEGAL THEORY 133, 148
(2014).
60. The suggestion here is similar to the claim that research flowing out of the attitudinal
model of judicial behavior overstates the influence of political factors by considering only those
cases that are litigated. See, e.g., Kahan et al., supra note 53, at 358.
61.
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Is a search for the original understanding of the Constitution the only
legitimate means of approaching it, or does that misconceive the
appropriate nature of the enterprise? What is the proper way to approach
stare decisis? Does empathy have a role to play in the judicial process?
Does “judicial activism” entail a failure to adhere to the original
understanding of the Constitution or a failure to be appropriately
deferential to the political branches? These are but a few of the many
issues as to which there are distinct positions, held in good faith, that are
the product of each judge’s balancing and prioritization of the many
considerations at work.
As with judging in aesthetic sports, the third category includes any
basis for reaching a decision that does not involve good-faith application
of considerations from the first two categories. The spirit of the
distinction, if not its precise content, was captured well by Justice David
Souter in his response to an item on a questionnaire from the Senate
Judiciary Committee in connection with his nomination to the First
Circuit.62 In providing his views on judicial activism, Justice Souter noted
“the distinction between personal and judicially cognizable values.”63
The most obvious examples of the former include the sort drawn on in
what could be characterized as purely political or otherwise “resultoriented” judging. Law, properly applied, will often require a judge to
reach a result in a specific case or with respect to a particular issue that is
different from the result she would reach if she were free to decide in an
unconstrained fashion.64 Stated generally, any reason that leads a judge
to fail to meet that criterion would fall into this category. Other examples
beyond a simple preference for a specific result include a desire to favor
a specific litigant, a desire to please certain other audiences for a decision

While nearly all theorists would agree that the text is the starting place for
constitutional interpretation, and most even agree that text should be
determinative if it clearly prescribes a certain result, there is a wide range of
views on such questions as when the text is clear and what judges ought to do if
it is not.
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 175 (3d ed. 2007).
62. See Linda Greenhouse, An ‘Intellectual Mind’: David Hackett Souter, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/24/us/man-in-the-news-an-intellectual-minddavid-hackett-souter.html [https://perma.cc/554C-SBXN].
63. See id.
64. See Jeffrey Malkan, Retrospective Justification, 6 TOURO L. REV. 213, 238 (1990). The
distinction is perhaps most evident in the different decision-making processes of courts and
legislatures. Judges are expected to provide a justification for their decisions, and that justification
is a key component of the legitimacy of a judicial decision. See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, The
Case for Independence, 61 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 12 (2001). Legislative votes need not be explained,
by reference to principle or otherwise. Id.
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(such as an appointing authority or a judge’s social peers), or having an
economic stake in the outcome.
Here, too, the operation of factors in this third category need not be
intentionally or even consciously invoked to provide cause for concern.
The evidence suggests that judges fall prey to at least many of the same
systematic cognitive errors as people more broadly,65 which can drive
their decision-making away from that which might flow from a truly
dispassionate analysis. And at least some of the observed correlation
between judges’ ideology and their decision-making is likely a product
not of ideology’s influence on good-faith differences concerning the
nature of the judicial role, but rather its clouding of thought. As Justice
Robert H. Jackson observed in his Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer66 opinion,
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and
publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of
a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked to
promote . . . . The tendency is strong to emphasize transient
results upon policies . . . and lose sight of enduring
consequences . . . .67
The legal system employs a variety of mechanisms to channel judicial
decision-making toward factors falling into the first two categories. The
norm is for judicial decisions to be accompanied by a written or at least
oral justification in which the judge or panel of judges offers
appropriately legal reasons.68 Appellate courts, which are the sole source
of precedential authority, and as to which there is thus greater need to
ensure that decisions reflect a closer approximation of the ideal
conception of law, engage in panel decision-making.69 This is, in effect,
a mechanism for producing decisions that are more likely to approximate
that ideal.70 Various ethical rules require judges to recuse themselves in
situations presenting conflicts of interest or otherwise involving factors

65. For an overview, see generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the
Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 203, 211
(2017).
66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
67. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68. For an exploration of the norms and standards governing the issuance of judicial
opinions, see Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96
GEO. L.J. 1283, 1288–97 (2008).
69. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1037, 1044 (1999).
70. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J.
82, 97–98 (1986).
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that might cause an observer to call their impartiality into question.71 The
adversarial process itself is designed to provide judges with opposing
perspectives advanced by parties with the incentive to offer the best
version of their case.72
Acculturation and selection processes play a role as well, though their
operation differs considerably from the arrangements in aesthetic sports.
Judges’ introduction to the profession occurs in law school, where, with
some variation from one law school to the next, everyone studies the
same core set of topics.73 The remainder of law school provides
considerable curricular flexibility, which, together with the influence of
differing pedagogical tendencies and would-be judges’ interaction with
differing student cultures among law schools, limits the uniformity of this
initial period of professional acculturation.74 Things become even more
diffuse as lawyers begin and progress through their practice careers,
which tend toward specialization. Those lawyers who are litigators must
of course pitch their arguments to existing judges, and do so by reference
to past cases and other pertinent authority, and in that sense must continue
to absorb the system’s norms and understandings. But the content of the
ideal itself, as conveyed through its most visible manifestations, will
typically be less salient than in aesthetic sports, which often feature
examples of excellence on the Olympic stage every four years. This will
be so whether that ideal is imagined to exist in some global, Dworkinian
sense or instead limited to more discrete subject areas.
Judicial selection practices in law are likewise less well equipped to
foster deep uniformity. The selection process for federal judges involves
political actors in the form of both the President and the Senate, and
especially in eras of political polarization seems likely to result in the
selection of judges whose preferences with respect to the sorts of factors
in category two will differ considerably depending on which party
controls the selection process. These differences can be exacerbated by
associated changes in the nature and scope of the generally accepted
factors in category one because, as will be developed below, the
boundaries between the categories are not fixed, and once-contested ideas
can become bedrock principles and vice versa. These changes, of course,
are connected to, if not products of, changes in the larger social and
political context in which the judiciary operates.
71. “There is perhaps no more basic precept pertaining to the judiciary than the one holding
that judges should be sufficiently detached and free from predisposition in their decision-making.”
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.01, at 4-2 (4th ed. 2007).
72. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 273–305 (2004)
(addressing the significance of party participation).
73. See Shawn P. O’Connor, What to Expect as a First Year Law Student, U.S. NEWS
(May 21, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/law-admissions-lowdown/2012/05/21/
what-to-expect-as-a-first-year-law-student [https://perma.cc/7PBS-ZYGU].
74. Id.
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II. AESTHETIC JUDGING AND THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
A. The Unwritten Constitution
Viewed as a practice, constitutional law in particular bears a strong
similarity to aesthetic sports insofar as it is replete with incompletely
articulated concepts and understandings. Indeed, the idea that
implementation of the Constitution by its very nature requires resort to
extra-constitutional considerations is a familiar one. The document
cannot legitimate itself,75 provides no guidance as to how it is to be
interpreted,76 and requires the development of “decision rules” by which
its provisions can be applied to specific controversies.77 All of this, in
turn, entails resort to larger ideas including those about the nature of the
government created by the Constitution and the role of the judiciary
within that government. There is much to constitutional law that is, in
effect, unwritten78—even if one believes that the meaning of the
Constitution was fixed at the time of ratification.79
75. Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 145 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
76. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional
Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (1994) (“[T]hat neither the constitutional text, nor
any other internal conception of what the Constitution is, can provide, without fatal circularity,
any guidance in determining what constitutes the Constitution.”). But not everyone accepts this
proposition. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 858, 861–62 (2009).
77. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 113 (2004)
(“[T]he competing demands of stability and flexibility might find more effective reconciliation in
the development of stare decisis practices that allow decision rules to be modified or abandoned
somewhat more readily than operative propositions.”).
78. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY, at xi (2012) (“The written Constitution cannot work as intended
without something outside of it—America’s unwritten Constitution—to fill in its gaps and to
stabilize it.”).
79. One who believes that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed, and that therefore the
only appropriate method for implementing it as law involves some sort of originalism, must still
select from among the many varieties of originalism, choose the level of generality at which to
apply the concepts embodied in the fixed Constitution, and otherwise make decisions about
application that are necessarily driven by arguments and considerations external to the document.
See Kahan, supra note 8, at 17. One of the weaknesses in the originalist position is that it too
casually equates the Constitution with ordinary law, thereby assuming that the Constitution should
be treated in the same way a statute should be treated. But while there is a clear rule of recognition
for statutes—more or less that they were enacted in accordance with the Constitution—there is
not similarly a clear rule of recognition for the Constitution, and indeed at the time of ratification
the notion that a constitution should be treated analogously to a statute was largely unknown. See
JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE
FOUNDING ERA 7 (2018) (noting that at its inception, the Constitution was not understood as a
fundamentally written text or as “a conventional species of law—defined by its legal content and
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The components of this unwritten constitution range from the concrete
to the abstract. The most concrete manifestations appear in the context of
the application of doctrinal tests to specific factual situations. The
concepts lying behind some of the Constitution’s open-textured
provisions—things like equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment,
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and so on—
cannot be completely articulated. Giving meaning to such general
propositions requires, in Llewellyn’s memorable phrasing, “the heaping
up of concrete instances.”80 A court in applying the concepts to a specific
situation relies as much on this accumulated, not-fully articulable
“situation sense” in reaching its decisions as it does on the traditional
tools of legal analysis. Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it”
standard, derided though it may be, embodies an important truth about
the nature of judging in constitutional cases and otherwise.81
Slightly more general in nature are what Professor Mitchell Berman
calls decision rules.82 The underlying insight is that there is a distinction
between determining the meaning of a constitutional provision and
determining whether that provision is satisfied in a specific situation, the
latter of which entails the development of a doctrinal framework for the
provision’s implementation.83 There is, for example, the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause and also the tiered scrutiny framework that the
Court has developed for its implementation.84 To discern the clause’s
meaning, such as by concluding that the clause contemplates some
version of formal or substantive equality, does not do all the work
required to determine whether its requirements are satisfied in a given
instance. Decision rules, or even what we might consider a nonbinding
decision standard such as the United States v. Carolene Products Co.85
underlying legal purpose, susceptible to orthodox legal reasoning, interpretation, and
adjudication, and thus the province of legal professionals to decode”). This is not to deny the
possibility that whatever it is that provides contemporary legitimacy to the Constitution could also
entail regarding originalism as the only legitimate means of interpreting the document, but rather
to suggest that such an approach is not inevitable, nor does it appear to be an accurate description
of the Constitution or constitutional practice as currently legitimated.
80. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 12
(1930). Justice Holmes set forth a similar idea several decades before, observing that
to make a general principle worth anything you must give it a body; you must
show in what way and how far it would be applied actually in an actual system;
you must show how it has gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of concrete
instances no one of which established it in terms.
Holmes, supra note 56, at 34–35.
81. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
82. See Berman, supra note 77.
83. Id. at 9.
84. See id. at 32–33.
85. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Footnote Four framework,86 can easily be regarded as part of the
unwritten constitution.
Finally, there are the more abstract principles and ideas that guide the
formulation of the more specific doctrinal components. There is the basic
question of what counts as a valid argument,87 and it is fashionable for
participants in constitutional debates to speak in terms of “arguments
moving from off the wall to on the wall”88 as the terms of the broader
political and sociological contexts from which these arguments arise
shift. This happens not in accordance with some clearly defined rule of
recognition, but rather via subtle change introduced through the various
mechanisms of acculturation that produce a substantial part of a judge’s
outlook. Shifts in these broader, less tangible aspects of the unwritten
constitution in turn affect the content of its less abstract components (such
as decision rules) as well as the accepted understanding of the written
portions of the Constitution. This set of ideas includes as well the
judiciary’s conception of its own role within the system of government,
including its view of its proper role relative to the political branches and
its sense of its own institutional capital. Such considerations manifest
themselves at a retail level in the contours of the various justiciability
doctrines and the Court’s exercise of the passive virtues89 as well as at a
more wholesale level through the terms of the Court’s engagement with
the other branches. Marbury v. Madison90 was the work of a Court that
86. See id. at 152 n.4.
87. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1960.
88. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/
from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https:
//perma.cc/Q4SL-T8E6] (“Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers think are
clearly wrong; on-the-wall arguments, by contrast, are arguments that are at least plausible, and
therefore may become law, especially if brought before judges likely to be sympathetic to them.
The history of American constitutional development, in large part, has been the history of
formerly crazy arguments moving from off the wall to on the wall, and then being adopted by
courts.”).
89. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111 (1962).
In a narrow sense, the passive virtues are techniques of adjudication (or rather,
of non-adjudication). More broadly understood, they are the forms of practical
wisdom, the modalities of prudence, whose mastery and proper exercise are
essential to the external aspect of the Court’s work—its effort to ameliorate the
Lincolnian tension by fashioning a continually improving accommodation
between the claims of principle on the one hand, and the resistant pressures of
existing beliefs and institutions on the other.
Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1584
(1985).
90. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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viewed itself as having a substantial role in checking the political
branches but that was unsure of its institutional capital. Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission91 was the work of a Court with high
regard for its own power in both senses.
At any moment the sum of all of these unwritten, and to some extent
ultimately inarticulable, factors produces in any given Justice—and
through a process of simple arithmetic in the Court itself—if not a strong
sense that there is a specific “right” answer to a given constitutional
question, at least a sense that the range of possible acceptable answers is
constrained. To be sure, that range may be broad, occasionally to such an
extent as to appear to provide little real constraint. But the forces remain,
even (and perhaps especially) in cases where the traditional material of
legal reasoning cannot do all the work.
B. Aesthetic Judging and Constitutional Change
These unwritten constitutional concepts can potentially fall into any
of the three categories of grounds for decision outlined above. Generally
accepted, category-one factors include basic suppositions about the
nature of the Constitution (such as that the text matters in more than an
aspirational sense) as well as understandings of notions like separation of
powers, the democratic process, and the nature of adjudication. Concepts
with a more evident textual hook fall into this category as well. For
example, Matthews v. Eldridge92 states an accepted notion of the core of
what procedural due process requires and provides a framework for
application of that core to specific situations.93 It is necessarily imprecise
in doing so, however, simply because it is impossible even to identify in
advance all the various settings in which the concepts must be applied,
much less prescribe the process required in each of them. Ultimately,
then, “due process” serves to invoke an idea that is akin to “flow and
effortless glide,” and its proper application requires immersion in the
practice, in both senses, of law and the accompanying exposure to the
factors that play into the determination of how much process is due in any
given situation or situation-type. The scope and prevalence of factors
falling into this first category are often overlooked, but the evidence
suggests that their effect is considerably greater than meets the eye.94
Roughly 40% of the Supreme Court’s decisions in recent decades have
been unanimous.95 Of course, considering only the cases the Court elects

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335, 348.
FALLON, supra note 10, at 120–23.
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/5

20

Oldfather: Aesthetic Judging and the Constitution (or, Why Supreme Court Jus

2020]

AESTHETIC JUDGING AND THE CONSTITUTION

411

to review certainly understates the extent to which the Justices agree.96
Further, it seems reasonable to believe that much of that agreement relates
to unwritten aspects of the constitutional order.
The second category includes the sorts of issues and questions that get
most of the attention in constitutional law classrooms and scholarship.
The participants in familiar debates over originalism and its
alternatives,97 the proper approaches to formulating and implementing
ideas about federalism and separation of powers,98 how to identify and
develop unenumerated rights,99 and the like bring with them good-faith
differences in perspective, which function in ways that are parallel to
differing schools of thought about the components and nature of an ideal
figure-skating performance. These differing perspectives can, at least in
general, be regarded as flowing from differences on more abstract matters
about the nature and function of the Constitution, perhaps especially with
respect to the appropriate nature and scope of the judicial role. Without
question many of these differences are correlated with ideology, though
the causation may lie elsewhere.100 In addition, some of what drives
preferences in this category may be the product of unstated assumptions
about how worried we ought to be about factors in the third category
influencing the Justices’ behavior. One version of the argument for
originalism, after all, is the claim that any approach that does not tether
the Justices to a search for original public meaning leaves them free to
insert their own, nonlegal preferences into their decision-making.101 It is,
in other words, an argument for a specific category-two approach based
in concerns about the relative inability of other approaches to prevent
resort to category-three factors.102

96. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, What Are the Judiciary’s Politics?, 45 PEPP. L. REV.
455, 467–68 (2018) (suggesting that the Supreme Court will not be inclined to grant certiorari
presenting issues as to which there is consensus among ideologically diverse courts of appeals).
97. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS
AND PERSPECTIVES (4th ed. 2013) (surveying the judicial, political, and academic debates within
the field of American constitutional theory).
98. See, e.g., JOHN H. GARVEY ET AL., MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER, at iii
(5th ed. 2004).
99. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), in which Justices Scalia and Brennan
debated the level of generality at which to consult history in determining whether an asserted
liberty interest is one that has been traditionally protected such that it can be deemed
“fundamental.” See id. at 127 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.); id. at 140–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. See Kahan et al., supra note 53, at 356–57.
101. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862
(1989).
102. Justice Scalia can be regarded as having made another such point in his essay
advocating in favor of rule-based lawmaking by the Supreme Court:
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Indeed, concerns about the influence of category-three factors are
prevalent in debates about the functioning of the Supreme Court and of
constitutional law more generally. The Court is often characterized as a
political court,103 the Justices are commonly described as being either
“liberal” or “conservative,”104 and many regard at least some of its higher
profile decisions as the product of an only thinly veiled result
orientation.105 At the same time, the Justices themselves routinely employ
rhetoric in their opinions that is consistent with the conclusion that they
regard their colleagues as falling prey to the influence of such improper
considerations.106 Those influences, to the extent they exist, are certainly
the product of unwritten factors, though, due to their acknowledged
illegitimacy, not the unwritten Constitution.
Taking all of this as a whole provides a way of thinking about how the
Court goes about its work. Ideally, in deciding cases, the Justices will
draw upon factors in categories one and two in varying combinations
depending on the case. Often the application of these factors will be clear,
resulting in a unanimous or near-unanimous decision.107 Often the factors
will conflict. Sometimes, undoubtedly, the Justices will be making law,
in the sense that none of the text of the Constitution, past case law, or
settled norms provides any sort of constrained framework for analysis.108

[W]e should recognize that, at the point where an appellate judge says that the
remaining issue must be decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances,
or by a balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a finder of
fact more than a determiner of law. To reach such a stage is, in a way, a
regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that we have passed the
point where “law,” properly speaking, has any further application.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (1989).
103. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 39 (2005).
104. Perhaps the strongest statement of the position comes from the architects of the
attitudinal model of judicial behavior:
This model holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of
the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put,
Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall
voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal.
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 86 (2002).
105. Id.
106. Perhaps the most prominent recent example is Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in
Obergefell v. Hodges: “The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it
announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2611–12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004); PPL Mont., LLC v.
Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012).
108. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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But often they can be regarded as, in a real sense, “finding” it.109 This can
be true in the sense that a case calls upon the Court to implement one of
the open-textured provisions of the Constitution, involving a legal
concept that can be stated only in generalities and can be fully appreciated
only through its particular applications.110 The Court in such a situation
is not so much engaged in a quest to make law as to discover, apply, and
refine as necessary the underlying concept. It can be true in a broader
sense as well. A Justice confronted with a question of the sort that is not
frequently contested might nonetheless perceive herself as (and perhaps
be) engaged in a similar process. She, too, might be drawing upon a set
of concepts that she has internalized and that she regards as leading her
to a correct answer.111 She will be acting in a manner akin to a judge in
an aesthetic sport. And we might imagine that in many cases enough of
her colleagues will find themselves guided by those same concepts in
such a way and to such a degree that we can characterize the Court itself
as acting in such a manner.
Viewing the Supreme Court and the nature of its work through this
lens provides a useful perspective on change in constitutional law. As
with aesthetic sports, change can come from outside, here in the form of
constitutional amendment. But change is likewise inevitable within the
practice itself and via mechanisms that the aesthetic-judge metaphor
highlights. The members of the Court change over time, and with changes
in personnel comes change in the Court’s collective conception of the
proper content and mechanisms of constitutional law.112 Consider for
example the evolution in understanding of what the Equal Protection
Clause requires. For the iteration of the Court that was responsible for
interpreting and implementing the clause in its early years, the
classification of people based on race and sex was largely unremarkable
in ways and to an extent that are unthinkable today.113 But society’s
understanding of equality changed over time, and the legal profession’s
understanding of equality and of the sorts of factors that are pertinent to
answering questions relating to equal treatment as a legal concept
likewise changed as the composition of the Court was refreshed over
109. For a recent favorable treatment of the notion that it is entirely plausible to regard judges
as “finding” law, see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019).
110. See Holmes, supra note 56, at 34–35.
111. For a compelling discussion drawing primarily on Llewellyn’s work, see ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 209–25 (1993).
112. FALLON, supra note 10, at 114–20.
113. Consider the apparent ease with which the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson. See Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . . . [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes
or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable . . . .”),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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time.114 Such changes occur on a smaller scale as well—such as the
Rehnquist Court’s incremental adjustments in favor of federalism—via a
mechanism that Professors Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson called
“partisan entrenchment.”115 New Justices generally “reflect the vector
sum of political forces at the time of their confirmation,” and as social
and political tides shift so will the Court’s jurisprudence and, in turn, the
established understandings of constitutional practice.116 Over time the
contents of categories one and two, and perhaps even occasionally three,
shift as ideas and understandings go in and out of fashion.117 As with
aesthetic sports, these sorts of shifts are necessary to maintain the
perceived legitimacy of the Court and its decisions because a Court that
falls too far out of step with society or the political branches runs the risk
of being marginalized or even ignored.118
These shifts are aided and moderated by other, more procedural
aspects of the unwritten constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis serves
to provisionally fix our understanding of constitutional meaning in
transitional areas.119 The doctrine comes into play only in situations
where a later court believes that a past decision was likely wrong, but not
114. The Court that decided Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), manifests an entirely
different attitude from that of the Plessy Court, noting that statutes making racial distinctions must
meet a “very heavy burden of justification,” id. at 9, and concluding that Virginia’s miscegenation
statutes were based in nothing but “invidious racial discrimination,” id. at 11.
115. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001).
116. See id. at 1067–71.
117. As Richard Fallon puts it:
[L]aw, in the relevant sense, resides in norms of judicial practice that structure
and constrain but do not always uniquely determine legal judgment. Such norms
allow room for reasonable disagreement but mark some positions as legally
untenable or unreasonable. What complicates matters is that even the norms that
exclude some conclusions as legally unreasonable can themselves have vague,
disputable fringes. In other words, we have, and need to understand the
possibility of, debates about whether some judicial rulings are beyond the pale
of the legally tenable.
FALLON, supra note 10, at 7.
118. As Amnon Reichman has observed, law as a practice does not exist in isolation. See
Amnon Reichman, The Dimensions of Law: Judicial Craft, Its Public Perception, and the Role of
the Scholar, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1619, 1643, 1651–54 (2007). Rather, it affects and is affected by
a host of adjacent practices, and at least sometimes the pull exerted by those practices will be
sufficiently strong to lead the Court to depart from strict adherence to the norms of the legal
profession. See id. at 1651–53, 1662–63. Given the interrelations among the various practices, it
is unsurprising to see change over time, and changes in what counts as a legal argument can and
will be influenced by forces located primarily outside of the legal system as we normally conceive
of it.
119. Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and Constitutional Interpretation, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014).
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wrong enough to merit overturning.120 A past decision regarded as clearly
correct does not need a thumb on the scale for a later court to adhere to
it. Such a later court would have reached the same outcome even without
the past decision and as such stare decisis will have done no work.121 It
thus serves as something of a shuttling mechanism between the first two
categories of reasons, providing a steadying influence as ideas and
interpretations come into and out of fashion.122 We might similarly view
aspects of the political question doctrine as part of a related judicial effort
to police the proper bounds of decision.123 Efforts to apply the “lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards” and “initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”124 prongs of
the doctrine can be regarded as attempts to delineate the boundary
between categories two and three.
The final sense in which the metaphor of the aesthetic judge is useful
is in serving as a cautionary tale. Judging, on this view, necessarily
involves the invocation of a host of unstated or partially stated norms,
practices, and understandings. Because and to the extent that these norms,
practices, and understanding are generally shared among the community
of judges, they serve as a critical source of constraint and regularity.
Certain approaches and certain results will be instantly recognizable as
inappropriate among those who share these understandings. But if they
are not shared, the community of judges will not converge on the same
set of answers. If the scope of disagreement is too large, and if the terms
in which the practice is contested include the allegation that some subset
of judges regularly draws on illegitimate, category-three factors, then the
judicial system potentially faces its own version of a figure-skatingjudging scandal. As Illinois Solicitor General Carolyn Shapiro has
forcefully argued, “there is a difference between considering judicial
decisions wrong and considering them illegitimate.”125 Such professed
120. BRIAN H. BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 153 (5th ed. 2009) (“[P]recedent
is only of crucial importance when the prior case was wrongly decided (or at least could have been
decided in a different way with equal legitimacy).”).
121. Id.
122. Oldfather, supra note 119, at 15–16, 18.
123. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
97, 101 (1998).
124. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
125. Carolyn Shapiro, Remarks at the Law Day Lunch Held by the McLean County (Ill.) Bar
Association (May 2, 2018) (transcript on file with author).
If we deny that judges and justices exercise discretion and judgment, if we claim
that there are logically deducible and objectively correct answers to even the
most difficult or controversial legal questions, if we believe, or pretend to
believe, that a nominees’ past thoughts and statements and actions are simply
irrelevant to their job as judge because all they are going to do is act as a legal
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certitude about the rightness of one’s own conclusions and the wrongness
of those who disagree, particularly when it appears in a judicial opinion,
can deepen the degree of conflict not only within the Court, but also
among the audience for its decisions.126
The root problem in figure skating may have been as much a problem
of perception as of the underlying judging.127 The relevant public came
to perceive judging in skating as driven by factors other than those by
which it should have been driven.128 Such a decay in perceived legitimacy
need not involve judges relying on category-three factors. It might,
instead, be the product of a perception that arises out of an apparent
prevalence of category-two factors relative to category-one factors. If
judging seems primarily to be a product of which school of thought one
adheres to, then what follows is a breakdown of the performative ideal.
There is not one ideal, subject to marginal disagreement as to some of its
aspects. There are instead multiple ideals, subject to multiple allegiances.
Such a loss of consensus in a sport can lead to a situation in which one of
the rival schools of thought breaks off to form its own version of the sport.
What the metaphor suggests, then, is the importance of the cultivation
and nourishment of shared norms in the world of law. This is especially
challenging in a world of great social change and deep division. But it
can take place in a number of ways, including civic and legal education,
individual judicial behavior,129 and structural design. The legitimacy of
computer doing legal math—then what does that mean when judges and justices
disagree, as in fact they often do? Logically, it must mean that some of them are
not just wrong—but lawless.
Id.; see also Carolyn Shapiro, The Language of Neutrality in Supreme Court Confirmation
Hearings, 122 DICK. L. REV. 585, 601–02, 637 (2018) (explaining that judges must exercise
discretion and judgment because, in many cases, “there is no clear ball or strike to call” and that
emphasizing neutrality and objectivity “could harm the Court’s legitimacy”); Carolyn Shapiro,
What Members of Congress Say About the Supreme Court and Why It Matters, 93 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 453, 458–59 (2018) (arguing that politically charged rhetoric undermines judicial legitimacy
when the rhetoric not only disagrees with a court’s decision but also states that the court’s
decision-making process was lawless or illegitimate).
126. See Kahan, supra note 8, at 60 (“Studies of motivated cognition and related dynamics
show that pronouncements of certitude deepen group-based conflict.”).
127. See Eric Zitzewitz, Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence
from the Reform of Figure Skating Judging, 15 J. SPORTS ECON. 3, 25 (2014) (explaining that
changes in the judging of figure skating may have been “to reduce the perception of corruption
rather than actual corruption”).
128. See Elena V. Stepanova et al., They Saw a Triple Lutz: Bias and Its Perception in
American and Russian Newspaper Coverage of the 2002 Olympic Figure Skating Scandal, 39 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1763, 1764 (2009) (mentioning the allegations of vote trading and a
“perception of thievery” during the 2002 figure-skating scandal).
129. For example, Dan Kahan suggests that the Justices should alter their opinion-writing
style to minimize the corrosive effects of motivated and identity-protective cognition. Kahan,
supra note 8, at 28, 30.
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the Constitution and the Court depends on the acceptance of, or at least
acquiescence in, the legitimacy of the entire constitutional regime,
including the judiciary’s role within it.130 It is, as the Civil War attests,
not such an easy thing for a subset of the population to break off and form
its own league if a portion of the population denies that legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
Among other things, viewing the role of judges in law by comparison
to their counterparts in aesthetic sports highlights the critical role that
socialization and acculturation play in the process of judging, as well as
how the connection between acculturation and decision-making supports
the perceived legitimacy of the entire enterprise. In an ideal world, or at
least one version of an ideal world, there would be complete uniformity.
Judges in aesthetic sports would share an understanding of the
performative ideal, and there would be complete consistency in rankings
from one judge to the next. Likewise, judges in the legal world would
share an understanding of the content of law, in both its written and
unwritten manifestations, as well as its application. Change would occur
seamlessly. We do not live in that world.
Both systems strive for an approximation of the ideal, while at the
same time implicitly recognizing that differences exist and that change
will occur and must be accommodated. Aesthetic sports, perhaps due to
their narrower domain, are able to achieve this more completely, in large
part by conditioning entry into the judicial ranks on a demonstration of
sufficient conformity with existing, shared understandings. Law provides
fewer such assurances. The acculturation process is more diffuse, and the
selection mechanisms are too susceptible to influence by partisans.
Extreme political polarization seems certain to undercut the scope of
shared understandings, and the growing influence of ideologically
inflected groups within law schools and the profession may serve both to
perpetuate and underscore the notion that there are “teams” not only in
the political sense, but also the legal one, with a corresponding increase
in the scope of category-two bases of decision-making and decrease in
category-one.131
130. FALLON, supra note 10, at 9 (“We accept the Court’s authority because we accept, and
most of us feel obliged to support, the Constitution and the American legal system as a whole.”).
As Tara Grove has argued, politically divisive moments like the present one can present two sorts
of challenges to the Court’s legitimacy, one arising out of the conflict between its sociological
and legal legitimacy and the other arising out of pressures arising out of dysfunction in the political
branches. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2272 (2019) (reviewing FALLON, supra note 10).
131. In an important recent book, Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum persuasively argue “that
the polarization of the parties has spilled over to Supreme Court appointments” and “that a less
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In the midst of all this a metaphor may seem trivial. I would suggest
the contrary—that a metaphor can function as a sort of meta-decision
rule, an encapsulation of all the various factors that play a part in
decision-making, a device for highlighting certain features of a situation
and why they matter, and a useful shorthand in thinking about how we
might assess the systems and processes of adjudication and constitutional
change. It can also serve as a cautionary tale. Just as scandals in figureskating judging led to outside intervention in the form of rule changes, so
too might a Court regarded as departing too far from shared norms invite
external intervention, whether in the form of court-packing or otherwise.

noticed phenomenon—the orientation of Supreme Court Justices toward elite networks whose
approval is important to them—has also helped to create party-line divisions on the Court.” NEAL
DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE
SUPREME COURT, at xvi (2019).
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